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Cognitive Culture Studies – Where science meets the 
humanities 
Peter Hanenberg 
By proposing the subject of my paper I must have been following the Romantic 
Idea of universal poetry and of the total art, some kind of rare blue flower of 
interdisciplinarity. Or I simply tried to honour my teacher Dieter Wuttke and his 
science of culture – as we say in German – based on Warburg’s example and estab-
lishing a scientific approach “Dazwischen”, in-between (Wuttke 1996). Some of 
the arguments certainly came to mind due to the crisis that the humanities have 
been suffering in Portugal and all over the world in the last decade, a kind of “A 
la recherche de la science perdue”. But of course I am aware of all the limitations 
that good will alone imposes on thinking. That is why I fortunately did not prom-
ise to show a way toward the unification of science and the humanities, but just 
their encounter. 
In this sense I would like to answer two questions: 1. Why could Cognitive 
Culture Studies be a place where science meets the humanities? And 2: How 
could Cognitive Culture Studies be a place where science meets the humanities? 
Nothing in my arguments is new, but I just try to bring together what I think to 
have learned from some of the colleagues who kindly joined our conference – 
and from some who unfortunately could not do so. 
The first question seems to be difficult, but it is not. Cognitive Culture Studies 
could be a path toward the unification of science and the humanities because 
cognitive and culture studies deal with the same subject. Of course this is not 
true for every kind or branch of Culture Studies and for every kind or branch of 
Cognitive Science, but there is a wide zone in which issues that belong to both 
fields meet. If you consider one of the famous introductions to Culture Science 
by Aleida Assmann you easily identify at least three (of seven) chapters as deal-
ing with “cognitive” subjects (in a clinical sense), namely “Body”, “Memory” 
and “Identity” (Assmann 2006). And if you compare this introduction for in-
stance with Alexandre Castro Caldas’ book in Cognitive Studies on “The legacy 
of Franz Joseph Gall”, you will recognize that “Language”, “Sign and Media” 
also belong to the overlapping interest of both researchers (Castro Caldas 2000). 
There are two more chapters in Assmann’s book that deal with two fundamental 
notions in human science, so that we expect insights on them from Culture as 
well as from Cognitive Studies: The notion and category of Time and Space. 
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Of course there are different ways to deal with the subject, since culture and 
cognition themselves are multi-dimensional realities. In his semiotic model of 
culture Roland Posner has distinguished three dimensions: the mental, the mate-
rial and the social dimension of culture. The social dimension deals with institu-
tions and society, the material with texts and works, and the mental dimension 
with perception, norms and values (Posner 1991). We are very used to finding 
the first and second dimensions represented in two different schools of Culture 
Studies, namely in the so-called German tradition of Kulturwissenschaft (founded 
by Georg Simmel, Aby Warburg, Walter Benjamin and Ernst Cassirer) and the 
so-called Cultural Studies, developed mainly by Stuart Hall and his Birmingham 
School. As far as I see, there is no leading school or tradition for the mental 
dimension of culture. And even less explored is the area where the three dimen-
sions overlap. A cognitive culture approach could be an answer to this situation, 
strengthening a holistic perspective where distinguished interests have estab-
lished separate fields of study. In this sense, sciences and the humanities would 
meet in the way they accept and establish a common field of study and develop a 
common interest in describing and explaining relevant phenomena in this field. 
The second question, how this could be done, is quite more complicated – and 
I would not even dare to propose a definitive answer. But I would like to suggest 
four areas of research and study as well as one principle that could be useful to 
do our first steps onwards to a meeting of science and the humanities. 
The first area of studies I want to suggest is Culture as “joint attention”. I borrow 
the term from Michael Tomasello’s research on the human adaption for culture 
(Tomasello 1999: 513), because it allows us to acknowledge right from the be-
ginning the social dimension of culture – even if we look at it from a cognitive 
perspective. Culture is shared and social by definition. This sharing is different 
from just staying together or even imitating the other. Sharing counts on the 
individuality of the other and on the other’s intention. The first moment is com-
munication, the second is learning and the third is culture and all moments go 
together in a constant process. Comparing it to non-human primate social learn-
ing and cognition, Michael Tomasello states the difference of human learning 
and cognition as the new: 
The new form of social cognition that started the entire process involved understanding other persons as 
intentional agents like the self, and the new process of social-cultural transmission involved several forms 
of cultural learning [...]. These new forms of cultural learning created the possibility of a kind of 
ratchet effect in which human beings not only pooled their cognitive resources contemporaneously, 
they also built on one another’s cognitive resources over time. (Tomasello 1999: 526) 
With these observations we gain three fruitful insights in and for culture studies. 
First of all, we can situate Culture and Culture Studies in the context of Evolu-
tion and thus of Biology. The important point is that Culture is not detached from 
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Evolution and Culture Studies are not out of Biology so that they can be seen 
together. Culture is a natural state of evolution – and thus its study should account 
for that. Karl Eibl’s research on the origin of poetry is a good example to prove the 
richness of such an approach. His book “Animal Poeta” (Eibl 2004) reveals the 
building blocks – as he calls it – of a biological theory of literature and culture. 
The exploration of a “Non-World” (Eibl 1995: 12) through playing, literature 
and art is a cultural concretion of a biological opportunity. Cognitive culture 
studies are aware of the biological foundation of culture. 
The path from evolution to history is indeed learning. The importance of 
learning is the second aspect that emerges from the foundation of culture in the 
capacity for “shared intention”. Cognitive culture studies are concerned with 
learning as the fundamental process of cultural sustainability and development. It 
is not by chance that cognitive science found a broad acceptance in the field of 
education. The new and human cultural evolution “created artifacts and social 
practices with a history, so that each new generation of children grew up in 
something like the accumulated wisdom of their entire social group, past and 
present”, as Tomasello put it (Tomasello 1999: 526). Consider just for a moment 
that Cognitive Culture Studies could ask for the accumulated wisdom in contem-
porary culture (or in some of its artifacts and social practices) and you suddenly 
discover that culture studies become necessarily a critique of culture – perhaps in 
the Adornian sense of the word. This is the path Manfred Spitzer and some other 
German researchers took in the study of Cognition (Spitzer 2002). 
In Leonard Talmy’s “Cognitive Culture System”, “education” is present as well, 
namely in the process of patterning through which the individual assesses “certain 
kinds of regularities, patterns, and norms” (Talmy 2003: II, 378f.). Talmy’s point 
is “that there has evolved in the human species an innately determined brain 
system whose principal function is the acquisition, exercise, and imparting of 
culture” (Talmy 2003: II, 373). Talmy’s Cognitive Culture System is the third 
point I would like to make concerning culture as “shared intention”. It is an ex-
cellent instrument to describe the process of assessing and sharing culture, work-
ing in the most different kinds of concrete realization. His description of “what is 
universal across cultures and what varies, of what is innate and what is learned” 
(Talmy 2003: II, 373) helps to overcome both false determinism and vain arbi-
trariness. Future culture studies will need it in order to establish their own scope 
and boundaries. 
I shall come to my second area in cognitive culture studies now, which is much 
easier to explain. It follows the line of evolution to history, but focuses on the ques-
tion of memory. Memory is the research field that links culture and cognitive studies 
most directly. There is a wide range of work done in both disciplines establishing 
a set of terms between “implicit” and “explicit memory”, of “short or long term”, 
40 
“semantic” and “episodic” or “working memory” and “sensorial memory” on the 
one hand. On the other hand we find distinctions between individual, collective 
(social or communicative) and cultural memory, symbols, agents and formation. 
There is of course a third discipline dealing with memory, namely Computer 
Sciences, in particular the branch of artificial intelligence, which, up until some 
years ago, seemed to be a kind of silver bullet of knowledge. 
I would just like to point out one issue in this field of memory that seems 
quite urgent to me. I take it from Merlin Donald’s book on the Origins of the 
Modern Mind (Donald 1993) and from his further articles: namely the role of 
external memory-storage for human memory and culture. What is going to hap-
pen to cultural learning when its means get faster and better day by day? How 
will the mind change when it can count on external service “at the distance of a 
click” – as we say nowadays? Cognitive Culture Studies will have to follow the 
issue critically – both in terms of its cognitive as in terms of its cultural implications. 
The key-point in the issue is perception and conception which seems to me a 
third area of Cognitive Culture Studies and I will follow Mark Turner’s famous 
suggestion to call it The Literary Mind (Turner 1996). Following his ideas on the 
Origins of Thought and Language the task – taken as general topic – is the de-
scription (and analysis) of the way we think. Of course there are quite a few ideas on 
that, but maybe it could be helpful to join once again a stricter cognitive point of 
view to the experience of cultural historicity. We soon discover that literature and 
art are not just a non-world, as Eibl suggested, but they are ways of conceptualiza-
tion, which are irreplaceable for understanding. Cultural artefacts, and particularly 
art works, are not just another way of representing reality; they are a special way 
of conceiving reality, in the first place – and by that they actually establish this 
reality. The way through perception and conception is not only a constructive 
process in terms of ception – as Talmy called it (Talmy 2003: I, 139) – but it is 
constructive in terms of reality as well. When someone criticised his portrait of 
Gertrude Stein for not looking like her, Picasso is meant to have said: “No problem, 
it will.” (Fischer 2005: 139) Reality comes to look like its representation; it’s just 
a matter of time. Regardless if this sentence is true or not, 20th century’s science 
proved definitely that reality highly depends on the way we look at it: light as a 
wave or as particles, speed and position of an electron, or the definition of en-
tropy: there is no reality in it before observation. That is why conception needs to be 
worked out, redefined, re-established – and one cultural process of doing so is art. 
That is why “Art in the advancement of understanding” – I am quoting Catherine Z. 
Elgin (Elgin 2005) – is a topic that cognitive culture studies have to deal with. Jonah 
Lehrer’s popular findings in his book “Proust was a Neuroscientist” (Lehrer 2007) 
belong to this field as well as Ernst Peter Fischer’s books on the history of science, 
namely “The Beauty and the Beast” (Fischer 1997; translated into English 1999) 
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and “Einstein meets Picasso and goes to the cinema with him” (Fischer 2005). 
Fischer states that further progress in science will be impossible without the help 
of aesthetics (Fischer 2003: 423). Working on the literary mind, on the way we 
think, Cognitive Culture Studies can help join aesthetic and scientific ception to 
a deeper insight of who and where we are. The importance of spatial stories and 
parable, scripts and frames, figures and geometry is culturally bounded and cog-
nitively at place. Of course there is a direct way from “shared intention” to Lisa 
Zunshine’s application of Theory of Mind to the question “Why we read fiction” 
(Zunshine 2006), or to Patrick Colm Hogan’s “Thinking Jazz” (Hogan 2003). 
Any of them is double bounded in its results: enhancing knowledge on both 
culture and cognition. 
I should now like to turn to the fourth and last area in cognitive culture studies 
that I would like to call “tacit knowledge” – and it will take some minutes to deal 
with it. “Tacit knowledge” is a kind of unrevealed treasure both in culture and in 
cognitive studies – and I am convinced that it can only be considered with the 
help of the interdisciplinary approach that we suggest. “Tacit knowledge” has to 
do with the imprinting of regularities, patterns, and norms that we talked about 
when we referred to “shared intention” in our first point. The process of cultural 
acquisition opens a certain range of options that configure up to a certain point 
our way of thinking. The argument is not a deterministic one; on the contrary, 
the aim is to increase awareness on those elements that unconsciously act upon 
our thinking. If we do not take these elements into account, it is much easier to 
confound our own way of thinking with the only one. 
“Tacit knowledge” has been a frequent argument especially in business and 
administration studies. One of the best known authors in this area is Geert 
Hofstede with his famous books on – quoting a recent title – “Cultures and Or-
ganizations. Software of the Mind” with its promising subtitle “Intercultural 
Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival” (Hofstede 2005). We are of course 
not defending Hofstede’s classification and ranking of nations and cultures 
through the indexes of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty 
Avoidance and Long- or Short-Term-Orientation. But we recognize in his books (as 
well as in many others written with the same aim to characterize behaviour through 
cultural imprinting) the importance of those limits and configurations that are 
wider than the limits of the individual and smaller than the limits of humankind – 
and an attempt to render these limits and configurations visible, conscious, and 
thus treatable or even manipulable. This is an important point: such limits and 
configurations are not just given, they are learned and involved in a permanent 
process of reconfiguration that can be observed and should not be ignored. 
Other terms have been applied for that: mentalities, for instance, or Denk-
kollektiv, to use the expression introduced in the thirties by Ludwik Fleck (Fleck 
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2008). Richard E. Nisbett and colleagues even spoke about the Geography of 
Thought, analyzing (or establishing) the ways “How Asians and Westerners 
Think Differently ... and Why” (Nisbett 2003). Radically questioning the academic 
tradition, Nisbett found himself exposed to a disturbing alternative: “If the scholars 
in the humanities and other social sciences were right, then the cognitive scientists 
were wrong: Human cognition is not everywhere the same.” (Nisbett 2003: XVI). 
His Geography of Thought tries to explain in which sense both are right: cogni-
tion generally counts on a specific configuration in its cultural environment. 
The term “tacit knowledge” itself has been developed by Michael Polanyi in 
the fifties and gains new importance through cognitive studies, as an instrument 
to know more about cognitive culture realities. Michael Polanyi writes: 
Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to 
a like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on 
which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can operate 
outside such a fiduciary framework. (Polanyi 1974: 266). 
For Polanyi education within this framework prepares not only acting within it 
but it also anticipates future attitudes. In a world of permanent change, interaction 
between what has been learned and what emerges builds up continuously: “every 
time our existing framework deals with an event anticipated by it, it has to modify 
itself to some extent accordingly” (Polanyi 1974: 103). “Tacit knowledge” is not 
static but in a permanent change and yet counting on the anticipating power of 
the acquired framework: no experience without condition, no experience without 
implication. 
Douglas Hofstadter developed the interesting idea of a “Strange loop” (Hof-
stadter 2007) to describe what this means for the concept of the individual or – as 
he calls it consciously referring to the older tradition as a “soul“: the permanent 
interaction of experience and reflection, of self-awareness and external observa-
tion reaches out as a significant effect: in the end, everything is both experience 
and conception, both framework and outcome. Cognitive culture studies should 
attentively consider this close relation. 
Culture as the intimate relation of experience and conception is full of “self-set 
standards” and “unproven beliefs”, as Polanyi pointed out. If we want to avoid 
cultural essentialism or dogmatism, it turns out to be important to count on this 
and not to despise or ignore it. “We should be able”, writes Polanyi, “to profess 
now knowingly and openly those beliefs which could be tacitly taken for granted 
in the days before modern philosophic criticism reached its present incisiveness.” 
(Polanyi 1974: 268) 
This awareness or “profession” is even more important when we consider how 
much tacit knowledge and culture affect decision making. This is quite a wide 
and recent debate that is gaining visibility in several disciplines. I would like to 
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mention Gerd Gigerenzer’s research on the intelligence of the unconscious in his 
book about Gut feelings (Gigerenzer 2007). The recent discussion of the subject 
may, in a certain sense, be the result of the increasing complexity of decision 
making. “Gut feelings” seem to be a reliable guide to decision in all kinds of 
situations, especially when their complexity inhibits a formal and rational process 
of evaluation. 
Gigerenzer refers to Polanyi’s famous sentence “We know more than we can 
tell.” The unutterable is necessarily present in decision making. The first impor-
tant point is that any kind of cultural (or other utterance) does not just occur in 
our mind, but always in a specific situation. That is why cognitive studies alone 
cannot find answers to certain question of cognitive processes: “to understand 
behaviour, one has to look at both the mind and its environment”, concludes 
Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer 2007: 75). Our cognitive, conscious or logical reasoning 
cannot (always) control but a small part of real factors involved in complex deci-
sion making. That is why we need certain rules of thumb- as Gigerenzer calls it – 
to overcome complexity. These rules of thumb allow us to find a decision not 
although they ignore certain information but because they do so. 
Decisions and options are made not on the basis of an overall calculation, but 
following criteria of relevance and attention. Relevance and attention are framed, 
consciously or unconsciously – and thus they are the result of the process of 
shared intention and cultural learning as described before. There is no objective 
criterion for relevance and no guarantee for attention. It has to be worked out, 
through the permanent process of cultural communication. That is why we should 
not count on them arbitrarily or even take them for granted. Relevance and atten-
tion can be redirected, bypassed, seduced or even mislead. Once again we reach 
the point where cognitive culture studies are necessarily a matter of criticism. 
This issue of critique can be drawn in the line of several purposes. I already 
mentioned Hofstede’s “Cultures and Organizations” and I should mention the 
famous book edited by Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington “Cul-
ture Matters” and mainly Mariano Grondona’s “Cultural Typology for economic 
development” (Grondona 2000). But these examples should not mislead our 
conception of “Cognitive Culture Studies”. What is at stake is a better and 
deeper understanding of how cognition and culture necessarily interact – and not 
an immediate utilitarian application of this understanding. We should not confound 
learning with the acquisition of skills – and thus we should not leave Cognitive 
Culture Studies just to its application on growth (and greed) in economic develop-
ment. The deep and inseparable interaction of cognition and culture is about much 
more than that. It is about how provenance and projection find together. 
We cannot be without culture. We can be against a certain type of culture, 
against “certain kinds of regularities, patterns, and norms” (Talmy 2003: II, 
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378f.) but we cannot live without “regularities, patterns, and norms”. To know 
about them, to know about “tacit knowledge” and its visible translation in rules 
of thumb and gut feelings, to know how cognition and culture work together in a 
given cultural environment and in a concrete cognitive performance, that is the 
great challenge for Cognitive Culture Studies. 
Before I go back to the beginning I have to come to the end – introducing a prin-
ciple that should be observed in each of the four areas of study presented up to now: 
the first dealing with Culture as “shared intention”, the second dealing with mem-
ory, the third dealing with the “literary mind” and the forth on “tacit knowledge”. 
Observation in Cognitive Culture Studies is always observation of the second-order 
in the sense of Niklas Luhmann: Cognitive Culture Studies do not observe reality as 
such (in the sense of the empirical observation of the neurosciences), but it observes 
observations. Sometimes these things got mixed in Culture Studies. As a second-
order observation Cognitive Culture Studies can render visible the proper condition 
of observation itself, “so that we can describe more accurately what is going on” 
(Luhmann 2000: 57). A cognitive approach in culture studies would help us concen-
trate more on how culture is conceived and less on the question of what it is about. 
On the other hand, the cultural dimension brings cognitive studies back to History. 
Of course, considered “as an operation, the second-order observation is also a 
first-order observation”, as Luhmann points out, and thus it will not escape form 
its own conditioning. As long as it is worked out as a second-order observation it 
is “equipped with a higher degree of indifference against all other conceivable 
influences” (Luhmann 2000: 55f.), a higher degree of indifference that vanishes 
in the moment when the second-order observation is considered as an observa-
tion itself. All that I have said about Cognitive Culture Studies is of course sec-
ond-order observation. But in the moment that I started, a low degree of indiffer-
ence against all conceivable influences threw me back to this particular tacit 
knowledge that I wanted to share with you and that emerged from a Romantic 
ideal of universal poetry, the memory of my teacher and a certain dissatisfaction 
about the way in which the humanities moved away from science. 
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